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INTRODUCTION
R ECENTLY, the Supreme Court accepted the opportunity in Sosa v. Al-
varez-Machain2 to extinguish a heated debate that brewed among in-
ternational law scholars since the Court's 1938 landmark decision in Erie
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins.3 Erie cast doubt on the status of customary inter-
national law (CIL) in the federal court system by nullifying the existence
of federal general common law and declaring that federal courts could only
create new law pursuant to express legislative authorization.4 Prior to Erie,
federal courts considered international law a part of federal law and recog-
nized claims involving violations of CIL as part of their general common
law authority.5 Because Erie involved a purely domestic matter, post-Erie
scholars divided into two schools of thought regarding the effects of Erie on
the status of CIL. The majority of scholars contended that because viola-
tions of CIL implicated foreign relations, CIL remained a federal matter to
which Erie's grasp did not reach. 6 A minority of scholars, opposing this view,
claimed that federal courts could only recognize violations of CIL when
the legislative branch expressly authorized them to do so.7
I J.D. expected 2007, University of Kentucky College of Law.
2 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
3 Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
4 Id at 78.
5 The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) ("International law is part of our
law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate
jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their
determination.").
6 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § III (I) cmt. e
(1987) ("Customary international law, like other federal law, is part of the 'laws...of the
United States."') (internal citations omitted); Philip C. Jessup, Note, The Offences Clause after
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, I I8 HARv. L. REV. 2378 (2005).
7 Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary InternationalLaw as Federal Common
Law: A Critique ofthe Modern Position, I Io HARV. L. REv. 815 (I997).
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In i98O, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit fu-
eled the debate when it recognized a claim between two Paraguayan citi-
zens involving alleged violations of an international norm against torture in
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala. Without much analysis, the court in Filartiga based
its jurisdiction to hear the case on an apparent grant of legislative authority
in the Alien Tort Statute (ATS).9 The ATS was a part of the Judiciary Act of
1789 and had remained dormant until the court in Filariga revived it. For
nearly a quarter of a century, the decision to revive the ATS in Filartiga pro-
voked debate in the lower federal courts regarding the extent to which the
ATS granted authority to create causes of action based upon CIL. Unlike
the court in Filartiga, other lower federal court judges argued that the ATS
was purely jurisdictional and thus did not provide authority to recognize
new claims based on CIL.o
In 2004, the Supreme Court in Sosa responded to the long standing de-
bate by agreeing, in part, with both sides. In its holding, the Court agreed
that the ATS was purely jurisdictional and that the First Congress probably
intended that it apply to only a narrow group of already well-established
rules of CIL. The Court continued to rule, however, that federal courts
retained authority to recognize new causes of action based on CIL subject
to a few stringent limitations. Rather than silence the debate, the Court's
decision to allow the door to remain open to such claims "subject to vigilant
doorkeeping,"" sparked both criticism and differing interpretations about
the current status of CIL. While the majority of scholars have asserted that
Sosa supports the contention that CIL is federal law,12 critics have alleged
that the analysis the Court developed to determine whether federal courts
could incorporate CIL as federal common law is inconsistent with the way
the Court normally treats post-Erie federal common law and that it pro-
vides little guidance for lower federal courts.' 3
8 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 E2d 876 (2d Cir. 198o).
9 See id. at 88o-81, 887.
io An example of this disagreement can be found in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic. In
Tel-Oren, the D.C. circuit dismissed an ATS suit concerning a terrorist attack in Israel. In the
concurring opinion Judge Bork asserted that neither the ATS nor customary international law
provided a private right to sue for human rights violations. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic,
726 Ead 774, 798 (D.C. Cir. 1984). In a separate concurrence, Judge Edwards disagreed with
Judge Bork's conclusion that the ATS was purely jurisdictional. Id. at 775.
i i Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 729 (2004).
12 Ehren J. Brav, Recent Development: Openingthe Courtroom Doors to Non-Citizens: Cautiously
Affirming Filartigafor the Alien Tort Statute, 46 H~Auv. IrNr'L L.J. 265, 272 (zoos); see also William
S. Dodge, Bridging Erie Customary International law in the U.S. Legal system after Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain, 12 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 87 (2oo4). But see Eugene Kontorovich, Implementing
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain: What Piracy Reveals about the Limits of the Alien Tort Statute, 8o NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 111 (2004).
13 See Kontorovich, supra note 12, at 114.
[Vol. 94
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
These critics, however, have neglected to fully consider the restrictive-
ness of the approach adopted in Sosa and how it compares to the federal
common law doctrine that has evolved since Erie. This Note reveals that
the analysis developed in Sosa for the treatment of CIL remains consistent
with the restrictive approach the Court has utilized in creating other types
of federal common law.
Part I of this Note defines customary international law and details the
debate surrounding its incorporation into federal law since Erie. Part II re-
views the Sosa decision and the substance of critiques which followed it.
As this part indicates, criticisms that the Court acted inconsistently with
historical notions of federal common law and separation of powers issues
consist of nothing more than conclusory statements with little to no com-
parative analysis to support them. Part III examines the federal common
law analysis that has developed since Eie and provides the background for
which to compare the analysis of the Court in Sosa. Part IV analyzes the
Sosa decision in light of the evolution of the federal common law doctrine
discussed in Part III. This part demonstrates that Sosa's restrictive limita-
tions for determining whether to incorporate CIL as federal common law
prove not only consistent with the way in which the federal courts have
treated other federal common law but actually provide more guidance than
the Court has given for other areas of federal common law.
I. SETTING THE STAGE FOR SOSA: THE PosT-ERIE CONTROVERSY
SURROUNDING CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
Two primary types of international law, treaties and CIL, exist to govern
the relationships between nations and more recently between individu-
als and nations. Treaties involve agreed-upon rules of law, and like other
contracts, bind only the parties involved. Whereas the domestic status of
treaties is constitutionally based and well developed, the law governing the
domestic status of CIL does not have such a clear basis. '4 The lack of clarity
results partly because of the difficulty in defining CIL. Rather than explic-
itly agreed upon rules, CIL refers to the general and consistent practices
in which nations engage based on a sense of obligation.'5 In other words,
CIL is derived implicitly from well-accepted, well-established practices of
nations. For example, international rules regarding the treatment of ambas-
sadors are largely derived from CIL.
CIL did not play a supporting or background role in Erie, yet the poten-
tial implications of Erie on CIL aroused interest among international law
14 RESTATEMENT ('TIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 6, at § I I I cmt. a-j
(restated in Reporter Notes 1-3).
15 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 6, at § Io2(2).
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scholars almost immediately. Erie held that "except in matters governed
by the Federal Constitution or by acts of Congress, the law to be applied
in any case is the law of the state."' 6 Erie ended the notion that a federal
general common law existed where federal courts were free to discover and
apply rules of decision to cases based upon diversity jurisdiction. Instead,
Erie reasoned that federal common law was created, not found.' 7 Unlike
pre-Erie general common law which only bound the parties to the suit, Erie
explained that federal common law was binding on the states.'8 As such,
Erie stood for the proposition that federal courts could only create federal
common law pursuant to a grant of legislative authority.'9
If the holding of Erie extended to cases involving the application of
CIL, then states could incorporate CIL into their common law systems and
recognize new claims based on CIL without regard to how other states were
adopting and interpreting CIL. Moreover, unless federal legislation existed
which addressed the specific CIL, federal courts would be obliged to ap-
ply varying state common law interpretations of CIL in diversity SUitS.
2 0
Because the potential for inconsistent interpretations of international law
implicates sensitive foreign affairs issues, Philip Jessup,' an international
scholar, asserted that the Erie holding had "no direct application to inter-
national law."22 Jessup rationalized that "any question of applying interna-
tional law in [federal] courts involve[d] the foreign relations of the United
States and [could] thus be brought within a federal power.' '23 The majority
of scholars as well as the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law 2,
adopted Jessup's view that CIL remained a part of federal common law.
Until Sosa, federal court decisions indicated support for the majority
view as well. For example, in upholding the "state doctrine" 5 as a rule of
federal common law, the 1964 Supreme Court, in Banco Nacionalde Cuba v.
Sabbatino, utilized Jessup's argument that "rules of international law should
16 Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938)
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
21 Philip Jessup, in addition to being a scholar, later served as a judge on the International
Court of Justice.
22 Philip C. Jessup, TheDoctrine of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins Appliedto InternationalLaw,
33 AM. J. INT'L L. 740, 741 (I939).
23 Id. at 743.
24 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw, supra note 6, at § I I i cmt. d
("Customary international law is considered to be like common law in the United States, but
it is federal law.")
25 The "state doctrine," precluded courts in the United States from engaging in an
exploration into the validity of a foreign state government's act. Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398,428 (1964).
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not be left to divergent and perhaps parochial state interpretations. "126 Be-
cause the state doctrine was neither congressionally nor constitutionally
mandated, the Court could only apply it pursuant to its authority to create
federal common law.27 In concluding that the state doctrine was part of fed-
eral common law and binding upon the states, the Court emphasized that
"if state courts [were] left free to formulate their own rules the purposes
behind the doctrine [would] be as effectively undermined as if there had
been no federal pronouncement on the subject."2
Although facing a situation that it considered "diametrically opposed to
the conflicted state of law that confronted the Sabbatino Court," the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in i98o, not only indicated
support for the majority approach but fully endorsed it when it recognized
a private cause of action between two Paraguayan citizens based on a viola-
tion of a CIL prohibition against the use of torture.29 The court in Filartiga,
however, did not analyze what source provided the authority to incorporate
CIL as federal common law other than to conclude that international law
was a part of federal common law.3° The Filartiga court based its jurisdic-
tion to hear the case solely on the ATS,3' a provision of the Judiciary Act
of 1789 which provides that "district courts shall have original jurisdiction
of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the
law of nations.' 32 This revival of the ATS sparked debate among scholars
and the federal courts over the extent to which the ATS was jurisdictional
versus the extent to which it permitted the federal courts to create new
causes of action.
33
In the mid-I99os, as a response to this growing debate, Curtis Bradley
and Jack Goldsmith, Law Professors at the University of Colorado and Uni-
versity of Virginia respectively, espoused a minority view that, absent some
explicit action by Congress or state legislatures, CIL was merely a matter
26 Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 425. Sabbatino involved a claim of conversion by an agent of a
Cuban instrumentality against an American commodity broker which arose after the Cuban
government expropriated the property rights of a Cuban corporation largely owned by U.S.
residents. The commodity broker had contracted with the corporation to buy sugar. Although
the broker accepted the bill of lading and sight draft from the Cuban government agent and
received payment for the sugar from its customer, it refused to turn over the proceeds to
the agent. The commodity broker urged the Court to consider the illegality of the Cuban
government's expropriation of the corporation's title to the sugar. Id.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 424.
29 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.zd 876, 884 (2d Cir. I98O).
30 Id. at 885.
31 Id. at 887
32 The Alien Tort Statute provides that "the district courts shall have original jurisdiction
of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a
treaty of the United States." z8 U.S.C § 1350 (2000).
33 See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
2005- 2oo6 ]
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of state common law.m4 In addition to this minority view, an intermediate
approach, proposed by Ernest Young in 2002, argued that CIL belonged
to a third category of "general law," a category which returned CIL to its
pre-Erie status.35 Under this status, federal courts could continue to import
CIL as a rule of decision in a particular case, and while that rule would be
binding upon the parties within the suit, it would not bind the states.
36
Questions regarding the status of CIL and the extent of federal courts'
authority under the ATS remained unanswered until the Supreme Court
accepted the opportunity to grapple with them in Sosa.
II. TAKING CENTER STAGE: THE SOSA DECISION
A. The Climax
In Sosa, the Supreme Court faced the issue of determining whether the
ATS authorized federal courts to entertain a cause of action between two
foreign nationals based on an alleged violation of an international norm
against arbitrary detention.37 The issue arrived to the Supreme Court from
a Ninth Circuit decision recognizing such a claim and ruling in favor of the
plaintiff-respondent in the case.
38
B. The Actors
The dramatic facts which gave rise to the issue in Sosa deserve brief atten-
tion not only as background information but also because they may contrib-
ute to some criticism that the Court's decision was results oriented. 39 The
unique series of events began with the murder of a United States Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA) agent in Mexico. After failed attempts
to extradite the respondent Alvarez-Machain, a Mexican physician that the
DEA believed to be involved in the torture of its agent, the DEA arranged
to have a group of Mexican nationals, including the petitioner Sosa, kidnap
Alvarez and bring him to the United States. Once in the United States, fed-
eral officers arrested him. He was subsequently indicted for the torture and
murder of the DEA agent, but for various reasons, unrelated to the scope of
this Note, the United States District Court for the Central District Court of
34 See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 7, at 845.
35 Ernest A. Young, Sorting Out the Debate Over Customary International Law, 42 VA. J. INT'L
L. 365,370 (2002).
36 Id.
37 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 697 (2004).
38 Id.
39 See Kontorovich, supra note 12, at 123.
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California granted Alavarez's motion for a judgment of acquittal in 1992.40
In 1993, Alvarez filed a claim against Sosa for arbitrary detainment.
4'
Faced with this unique sequence of events, the Ninth Circuit's ruling
in favor of the respondent Alvarez, and the U.S. government's support of
the petitioner Sosa, the Court set out in its attempt to clarify the heated
debate regarding the domestic status of CIL.
C. The Finale
The Supreme Court divided its holding which denied Alvarez a cause of
action into three parts. First, the Court held that the ATS "was intended as
jurisdictional in the sense of addressing the power of the courts to entertain
cases concerned with a certain subject,"42 as opposed to creating causes of
action based upon international law. Second, after conducting a lengthy
discussion of the historical context in which the statute was drafted, the
Court concluded that "although the ATS [was] a jurisdictional statute cre-
ating no new causes of action ... [tihe grant [was] best read as having been
enacted on the understanding that the common law would provide a cause
of action for [a] modest number of international violations[.]"43 These in-
volved three historical actions that Blackstone considered to be crimes
against international law at that time and included offenses against ambas-
sadors, violations of safe conduct, and piracy.44 Lastly, the Court found that
despite holding that the ATS was jurisdictional, federal courts maintained
some authority to create private causes of action based on CIL subject to
stringent limitations.
The Court fully agreed that Alvarez's claim against Sosa for arbitrary
detainment should be dismissed but divided in its reasoning. The Court
acted unanimously in the first two parts of its holding that the ATS was
jurisdictional and probably intended to encompass only a few offenses
against international law recognized at the time of its enactment. Had the
majority dismissed Alvarez's claim on the basis of the first two parts of its
holdings and reasoned that arbitrary detainment was not in the minds of
the First Congress when it granted jurisdiction under the ATS, the Court
would have remained unanimous. 45 However, against the wishes of Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas, the majority based its
dismissal of the claim on the third part of its holding which outlined the
40 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 697-99.
41 Id. at 698.
42 Id. at 714.
43 Id. at 724.
44Id.
45 See id. at 744 (Scalia, J., concurring).
2005- 2oo6 ]
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circumstances and limitations on which federal courts could recognize new
causes of action based on CIL.
46
First, the Court emphasized the importance of legislative intent, after
cautioning that courts should exercise serious judicial restraint in recog-
nizing such actions because there had been "no congressional mandate to
seek out and define new and debatable violations of the law of nations."
47 It
stated that the "general practice [of creating federal common law] has been
to look for legislative guidance before exercising innovative authority over
substantive law." 4s As an example of a demonstration of legislative intent,
the Court referred to the explicit grant of authority provided by Congress
in the Torture Victim Protection Act to recognize a cause of action for viola-
tions of CIL prohibitions against torture.
49
Other than looking toward legislative intent, the Court outlined three
other potential limitations: (i) the degree of specificity and acceptance
of the international norm; (2) whether the plaintiff exhausted remedies;
and (3) a case-specific deference to the legislative and executive branches
of government.50 With regard to specificity and acceptance, the court de-
clared that "any claim based on the present-day law of nations" should
"rest on a norm of international character accepted by the civilized world
and defined with a specificity comparable to [Blackstone's three above-
mentioned claims]."5' In order to merit such a claim, the norm must be
"specific, universal and obligatory" and not possess "less definite content
and acceptance than the historical paradigms familiar when [the ATS] was
enacted."52 In making this determination, the Court suggested that federal
courts evaluate the practical consequences of recognizing such a cause of
action5
3
In addition to specificity, the Court discussed a second limitation requir-
ing an inquiry into whether the plaintiffs had exhausted remedies in their
domestic legal systems as well as those available in international claims
tribunals.5 4 Lastly, the Court required federal courts to defer to the political
branches on a case-by-case basis55
After developing this analysis of determining when federal courts may
incorporate CIL to create a new cause of action, the Court applied it to the
facts of Sosa. The Court did not proceed beyond a discussion of the specific-
46 See id. at 738.
47 Id. at 728.
48 Id. at 726.
49 See id. at 73 1.
50 Id. at 732-33.
51 Id. at 725.
52 Id.
53 See id. at 732-33.
54 Seeid. at 733, n.21.
55 Id. at 733-
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ity limitation, though, because the Court found that the international norm
against "arbitrary detainment" had not reached a level of acceptance and
definiteness comparable to that of Blackstone's three historical offenses .
6
In reaching this determination, the Court considered the practical effects
that recognizing such a claim would have. After rationalizing that recogni-
tion of such a claim "would create an action in federal court for arrests by
state officers who simply exceed[ed] their authority," the Court rejected
Alvarez's claim without addressing the other factors5
7
D. The Critics
Since the Court's decision in June 2004, Sosa has generated strong interest
and mixed views among scholars. It has received praise from those scholars
who adhere to the majority opinion and believe that Sosa stands for the
proposition that CIL is federal common law.58 On the other hand, critics
who hold the minority viewpoint and believe that the opinion endorsed the
majority view, attack the opinion as being inconsistent with the post-Erie
federal common law doctrine.5 9 These scholars also criticize the opinion as
lacking guidance for the lower federal courts to follow in determining when
to incorporate CIL into federal common law.60
Also criticizing the majority opinion in Sosa as lacking in guidance, Jus-
tice Scalia quipped in his concurrence that the only restraint the major-
ity placed on federal courts to create new causes of action was the use of
their own discretion. 6' He further dismissed the specificity limitation as
hardly "a recipe for restraint in the future.' '62 Believing that the majority
confused pre-Erie general common law with post-Erie federal common law,
Justice Scalia attacked the majority's claim to have left the door open to
new causes of action. 63 According to Justice Scalia, Erie closed that door in
1938, and federal common law was a door best left shut.64
Scalia's viewpoint gained support of other scholars. For example, basing
his conclusion on the notion that "federal courts have been incapable of
creating common law" since Erie,65 Eugene Kontorovich, an assistant pro-
fessor at George Mason University School of Law, criticized the opinion for
56 Id. at 736-38.
57 Id. at 736.
58 See Dodge, supra note 12, at 88.
59 See Kontorovich, supra note 12, at 114.
6o See Bra, supra note 12, at 275.
61 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 745 (Scalia, J., concurring).
6z Id. at 748.
63 See id.. at 731 (majority opinion) ("[N othing Congress has done is a reason for us to
shut the door to the law of nations entirely.").
64 Id. at 746 (Scalia, J., concurring).
65 Kontorovich, supra note 12, at 122.
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the "fundamental inconsistency in its treatment of changes in the nature
of [CIL] and federal common law since the enactment of the [ATS]." 66 He
characterized the majority's analysis as preserving "the federal courts' com-
mon lawmaking power as it stood in the eighteenth century, while allowing
the scope and subjects of that power to keep pace with the organic growth
of [CIL] norms. ' ' 67 Other scholars, asserting similar claims, fault the major-
ity for giving lower courts little guidance in determining when to create
causes of action under the ATS. 68
These criticisms ignore the evolution of the federal common law doc-
trine since Erie. Both Justice Scalia's concurrence and critics who followed
rely on Erie's basic propositions that there is no federal general common
law, and that when authorized to do so, the courts do not find or discover
such law but create it. While true, these critics fail to take the next step
and explore the analysis that the federal courts have developed for creating
federal common law in the sixty-plus years since Erie. They have also not
considered the implications of the Courts' guidelines as a whole. Parts III
and IV of this Note demonstrate how these critics have overlooked the evo-
lution of federal common law doctrine since Erie. When compared to the
approaches that the federal courts have utilized in their treatment of other
types of federal common law, the majority's approach proves consistent.
III. PROVIDING A BACKDROP FOR COMPARISON: AN OVERVIEW
OF FEDERAL COMMON LAW
In order to provide context for the Sosa analysis, a review of the modern
federal common law doctrine is necessary. Since Erie, the Court has es-
sentially developed two approaches for creating federal common law.69 The
first approach involves the federal courts' creation of federal law to protect
important federal interests.7 The second category of federal common law
consists of those rules of federal law that have been created in order to ef-
fectuate congressional intent.7'
66 Id. at 114.
67 Id. at 123.
68 Bray, supra note 12, at 275.
69 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 6.1, at 358 (4th Ed. 2003).
70 Id.
71 Id.
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A. Protecting Federal Interests
The Court first undertookthe role of creating rules of federal law to pro-
tect an important federal interest in Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States.72
That case involved a question of whether, under a Pennsylvania state law,
the government's failure to provide Clearfield Trust Company prompt no-
tice of a forgery would bar it from recovering funds that the company er-
roneously dispersed to an unknown person. 73 In resolving this issue, the
Court announced that "in the absence of an applicable Act of Congress,"
the federal courts could "fashion the governing rule of law according to
their own standards" when the decision involved a "choice of a federal rule
designed to protect a federal right." 74 Although the Court did not elaborate
on what types of rights would merit a choice of rule, the Court's rationale
for determining that such a right existed provided some insight. The Court
considered such factors as whether a federal source for the right existed 75
and whether leaving the rule of decision to the state courts would "subject
the rights and duties of the U.S. to exceptional uncertainty" and "lead to [a]
great diversity in results."
76
The Court revisited the Clearfield doctrine in United States v. Kimbell.77
Kimbell involved a determination of whether liens arising from federal loans
take precedence over private liens.78 The Court determined that the issue
sufficiently implicated a federal interest, which warranted the protection of
72 Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366-67 (1943). Clearfld concerned
a check that had been issued by the federal government. An unknown person intercepted the
check before it reached its intended recipient and forged the signature of the intended recipi-
ent at a J.C. Penney retail store. Not aware of the forgery, I.C. Penney deposited the check
with Clearfield Trust Co. and received funds for it. Subsequently, the federal government reis-
sued the check. The government then sued Clearfield Trust for reimbursement of the funds
from the first check. Id. at 364-66.
73 Id. at 365-66.
74 Id. at 367.
75 The Court did not suggest that a federal source was mandatory or that the source
must explicitly supply such a right. For example, in this case, the Court found a sufficient
federal source in the fact that the check was issued for services performed under the Federal
Emergency Relief Act (FERA) and that the authority to issue such checks had its origin in the
Constitution and other statutes. Id. at 366.
76 Id. at 367.
77 United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 44o U.S. 715, 726 (1979).
78 See id. at 718. Kimbell actually represented a consolidation of two cases. The first case
involved a priority dispute between two competing liens--one executed by a grocery whole-
saler and the other stemming from a loan guaranteed by the Small Business Association (SBA).
Id. at 718-19. The other case involved a dispute between a federal contractual security inter-
est derived from loans given by the Farmers Home Administration (FHA) and a repairmen's
lien. Id. at 723. In both suits, the application of state priority rules would result in the federal
loan programs having a security interest junior to that of the private security interest. Id. at
719, 723.
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federal law.79 True to the Clearfield doctrine, the Court identified a federal
source from which important federal rights were derived.' Unlike Clearfield
though, Kimbell did not end its examination by creating its own rule of
federal law. Instead, it expanded the analysis to include a second-tier in-
quiry into the content of the rule and in particular whether to adopt a state
law or fashion a nationwide federal rule to protect the federal interest.8' In
making this determination, the Court considered whether specific federal
interests necessitated uniformity of decisions and whether the application
of state law would frustrate specific objectives of federal programs.12 Then,
the Court balanced those factors against the disruption that a federal rule
would cause to commercial relationships predicated on state law. After con-
ducting this balancing test, the Court concluded by adopting the state rule
of law to protect the federal interest involved.8 3
In sum, Clearfield and its progeny reveal a two-tier inquiry into whether
federal courts may adopt a rule of decision as part of federal common law
to protect a federal interest. The first tier involves considering whether a
significant federal interest warrants such a rule. In making this determi-
nation, courts have looked to whether a federal source exists to support
the interest.A4 After determining the presence of a federal interest, courts
engage in a second inquiry regarding the content of the rule. In deciding
whether to base the federal law on existing state law or develop a new rule,
courts balance the need for uniformity and the degree that state law would
frustrate federal objectives against the potential disruption to commercial
relationships predicated on state law. Federal courts will only adopt a rule
of decision as federal common law after they conclude that a sufficient fed-
eral interest exists, such that the factors of the balancing test weigh in favor
of creating a new rule to protect it.
79 Id. at 727.
80 The Court found that a sufficient federal source existed in the Acts of Congress which
authorized the two federal loan programs, the SBA and FHA, to effectuate loan transactions.
The Court reasoned that the constitutional function which Congress exercised in passing
such acts transcended to the loan programs such that important federal rights were implicated
in the execution of their liens. Id. at 726.
81 Seeid. at 728.
82 See id. In Kimbell, the Court reasoned that since federal lending programs must follow
state law in conducting many of their other daily activities, the federal interest involved in the
case did not necessitate a high degree of uniformity. The Court further found that adopting
a state rule of law would not interfere with the course of the agencies' operations or frustrate
federal objectives. Id. at 729-30.
83 Id.
84 See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
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'B. Effectuating Legislative Intent
A second category of federal common law consists of that common law de-
veloped by federal courts to fulfill Congress' purpose in adopting a particu-
lar statute. Situations involving this type of federal lawmaking may arise in
two situations-where a statute includes express authorization for federal
courts to create a body of common law rules and where the courts create
private right of action under a federal statute.8 s Since the second situation
occurs without an express authorization from the legislature, it has natural-
ly necessitated a more detailed analysis. Since Erie, three different analyses
have developed for determining when federal courts may create a private
cause of action under a federal statute.86 Although each has been progres-
sively more restrictive, none has been overruled.8 7
The analysis developed in J.L Case Co. v. Borak' represents the least re-
strictive approach. In Borak, the Court allowed a stockholder of a company
to bring suit against the company to enjoin it from merging with another
corporation and to recover monetary damages from violations of the Secu-
rities Exchange Act. s9 Although the Act did not provide for a private right
of action, the Court determined that "among [the Act's] chief purposes is
'the protection of investors, ' ' '9° and reasoned that because of this, the Act
"implie[d] the availability of judicial relief where necessary to achieve that
result." 9' As a result, Borak allows federal courts to create a private action if
damage suits would help accomplish the legislative purpose for a statute.
Almost ten years after Borak. the Court was confronted with another op-
portunity in Cort v. Ash to create a cause of action by a stockholder against
corporate directors based on a violation of a criminal statute prohibiting
corporations from making "a contribution or expenditure in connection
with any election... "92 The Court responded by engaging in a four-part
inquiry.93 First, the court questioned whether the plaintiff belonged to the
class "for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted."94 Second, the
Court considered the intent of the legislature, explicit or implicit, to create
such a cause of action.9s Third, the Court examined whether recognizing a
85 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 69, at §§ 6.2-6.3, at 368, 376.
86 See id. at 380-88.
87 See id. at 388 ("[Wlhen the court uses the third approach, it cites cases decided under
earlier approaches and no decisions have been expressly overruled.").
88 J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
89 Id. at 429-30.
90 Id. at 432 (quoting the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78(a)).
91 Id.
92 Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66,68 (1975) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 61o (197o ed. and Supp. III).
93 Id. at 78.
94 Id. (quoting Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39 916)).
95 Id.
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remedy would be consistent with the underlying purposes of the statute.9
Lastly, the Court ascertained whether the cause of action was one tradition-
ally relegated to state law.97 The Court did not provide any guidance as to
how the federal courts should weigh each factor.
Only four years after Cort v. Ash, the Court implemented yet another
more restrictive approach to determining whether federal courts could cre-
ate a cause of action pursuant to legislative intent. In Touche Ross & Co. v.
Redington, the Court confronted another request to create a private cause of
action for a violation of the Securities Act. 98 However, rather than engage in
the Cort v. Ash four-step analysis, the Court instead declared that the indi-
vidual factors were irrelevant to the facts in that case and emphasized that
the central inquiry remains to be "whether Congress intended to create,
either expressly or by implication, a private cause of action."99 Applying the
four factors of Cotv. Ash, the dissent stated that the plaintiffs were entitled
to bring a cause of action.'°0
Since Touche Ross, the Court has considered a variety of factors when
discerning whether the legislature explicitly or by implication intended to
create a cause of action including whether the statute provided for other
remediesol and legislative silence. °z Although the Court has consistently
exercised restraint in creating causes of action, the Court has created pri-
vate rights of actions where the same types of remedies have been recog-
nized by the courts in the past.'0 3
IV. SHINING A NEW LIGHT ON SOSA: A COMPARISON OF SOSA
WITH MODERN FEDERAL COMMON LAW DOCTRINE
Critics fault Sosa's treatment of CIL as being both inconsistent with post-
Erie federal common law and providing little guidance for lower federal
96 Id.
97 Cort, 422 U.S. at 78.
98 Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 56o 0(979).
99 Id. at 575-76.
oo Id. at 580 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
101 See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 1 (1979) (reasoning that
the existence of other remedies in the statute reflected a lack of intent to allow private actions);
Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (zoo I) (implying that the provision of other methods of
enforcement reflects an intent to preclude all others).
102 See Karahalios v. National Federation of Federal Employees, 489 U.S. 527 (1989)
(emphasizing that Congress knew "that such issues [judicially created private rights of action]
were being resolved by a straight-forward inquiry into whether Congress intended to provide
a private right of action").
103 See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353 (1981);
Herman & McLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375 (1982).
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courts to follow.104 However, in light of the federal common law doctrine
that has developed since Erie, the Sosa analysis proves consistent with
those restrictive approaches developed by the federal courts for creating
federal common law. Further, the Sosa analysis provides lower courts more
guidance than other approaches. This section demonstrates Sosa's consis-
tency by first comparing the Sosa analysis to how the courts have applied
the Clearfield doctrine. Then, it examines the consistency of Sosa with the
approaches that the federal courts have utilized to create federal common
law in order to effectuate legislative intent.
A. Protecting Federal Interests
In applying the Clearfield doctrine and its progeny, federal courts have been
reluctant to create rules of federal law in litigation involving private par-
ties.1os This reluctance, however, may result from the Court's own sense
of judicial restraint than anything inherently restrictive about the analy-
sis. Examining how the federal courts have applied the two tiers of the
Clearfield-Kimbell analysis separately provides a greater appreciation of both
the level of discretion involved in this approach, as well as its consistency
with the built-in restrictiveness of the Sosa analysis.
i. Determining Whether a Federal Interest Exists that Necessitates the Incorpo-
ration of CIL as a Rule of Federal Law. -As Clearfield establishes, the first
tier of the analysis entails discovering whether a sufficient federal interest
needs protection. Other than requiring a federal source to support the in-
terest, Clearfield and its progeny offer no further guidance regarding when
such an interest exists. Two cases in particular, Miree v. DeKalb Countyo0 and
Boyle v. United Technologies Corp.,107 illustrate how the result of a case may
turn more on the creativity of the court in finding.a federal interest than in
the adherence to the Clearfield doctrine.
Miree presented the question of whether the federal courts could create
a rule of federal law that would allow a third-party suit against a local coun-
ty government based on an alleged breach of its contract with the Federal
io4 See supra notes 58-68 and accompanying text.
105 See Miree v. DeKalb County, 433 U.S. 25,31 (1977) ("iThe litigation is among private
parties and no substantial rights or duties of U.S. hinge on its outcome."); Wallis v. Pan Am.
Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 72 (1966) (refusing to make federal common law in dealings
between private parties regarding an oil and gas lease issued under the Mineral Leasing Act
of 192o); Bank of America Nat. Trust & Savings Ass'n v. Parnell, 352 U.S. 29,33 (1956) ("The
present litigation is purely between private parties and does not touch the rights and duties of
the United States."); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 69, at 372.
io6 Miree, 4 3 3 U.S. 25 (1977).
107 Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988).
2oo5-2oo6]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
Aviation Administration (FAA). 1o8 The third parties represented survivors
of deceased passengers of an airplane crash.'09 The survivors alleged that
the County violated provisions of its contract with the FAA and contrib-
uted to the airplane crash by allowing a garbage dump to be placed adja-
cent to the airport."- Although voluminous aircraft regulations provided a
source from which the Court could derive a federal interest, the Court re-
jected the opportunity to create such a rule on the basis that "no substantial
rights ... hinged on [the outcome of the case]."",
Boyle involved an analytically similar situation. A father of a deceased
military helicopter pilot successfully brought a diversity suit in a federal
district court against a helicopter manufacturer and a military contractor,
under state tort law.,"2 The plaintiff's claim alleged that the manufacturer
had negligently designed the escape hatch of the helicopter to open out
instead of in so that when submerged in water the escape hatch could not
open because of the pressure." 3 On appeal, the Supreme Court had to
choose whether to create a rule of federal law that would subsume state
tort law and provide military contractors a defense to state tort liability. ",4
The Court could have found as it did in Miree that where the government
may have an interest in aircraft safety, it did not have any substantial rights
which hinged on the outcome of the case. Alternatively, as the dissent dis-
cussed, the Court could have concluded that state tort actions promoted
government interests in saving military lives by encouraging safer aircraft
designs." 5
The majority, however, per Justice Scalia, declined that route, and in-
stead carved a federal defense for military contractors from the discretion
exception of the Federal Torts Claims Act (FTCA)." 6 This exception of
the FTCA excuses government officials from tort liability when claims
are based on a discretionary action or function of their duties as govern-
ment officials." 7 Although the Act only pertains to government officials and
not military contractors,"' the Court found it relevant by reasoning that
the government officials who contracted with the manufacturer had exer-
io8 Miree, 433 U.S. at 29.
o9 Id. at 26.
iio Id. at 27.
iii Id. at 31 (emphasis added).
112 BoYk, 487 U.S. at 502-03.
113 Id. at 503.
114 Based on a mixture of both state law and federal law grounds, the Court of Appeals
reversed the jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff and remanded the decision with directions to
enter judgment in favor of the defendant manufacturer. Id.
ii Boyle, 487 U.S. at 530 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
116 Id. at 511.
117 Id. (citing the Federal Torts Claim Act, 28 U.S.C § 268o(a)).
i18 Id. at 511-12.
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cised discretion in contracting for that particular design of the helicopter." 9
The Court further explained that a federal rule was needed to protect the
federal government from price increases that would result when military
contractors "rais[ed] their prices to cover.., contingent liability for the gov-
ernment-ordered designs."120
Another example demonstrating the amount of judicial discretion in-
volved in detecting the presence of a sufficient federal interest occurred
when the federal source itself was not very clear. For example, Sabbatino"2l
required the Court to decide whether to incorporate the Act of State Doc-
trine (ASD) into federal common law.'2 2 The doctrine precludes courts from
inquiring into the validity of an official act of a foreign state's government. 2 3
The Court recognized that the ASD was neither constitutionally required
nor compelled by international law.'14 But, because cases in which the doc-
trine would apply implicated foreign affairs, the Court concluded that the
ASD protected an important federal interest which had its source in the
doctrine's "constitutional underpinnings" and the "basic relationships be-
tween branches of government in a system of separation of powers. '1' 2 5
The analysis of these cases does not serve as criticism of the federal
courts for inconsistencies in applying the Clearfield doctrine, but rather to
highlight the discretionary nature of the inquiry and the difficulty of ap-
plying it to varying fact patterns. Although courts have found substantial
federal interests in issues which concerning federal pecuniary interests and
foreign affairs, they have not provided any clarity for determining which
pecuniary interests or foreign affairs warrant the creation of a federal rule
of decision. On the other hand, Sosa has not only determined that a federal
interest exists in matters implicating CIL 26 but has also delineated factors
to determine the particular types of CIL claims that warrant the creation of
federal common law. 127
Sosa derives a federal interest in incorporating CIL into federal com-
mon law from the ATS. 2 The Court explains that since the
Framers [I assumed that federal courts could properly identify some in-
ternational norms as enforceable in the exercise of Uurisdiction under the
ATS] ... it would be unreasonable to assume that the First Congress would
I9 Id.
izo Boyle, 487 U.S. at 511-12.
IZ For the facts of Sabbatino, see supra note 25 and accompanying text.
122 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398,4 ° 0 (1964).
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 729-31 (2004).
127 See supra notes 47-55 and accompanying text.
128 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 729-30.
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have expected federal courts to lose all capacity to recognize enforceable
international norms simply because the common law might lose some meta-
physical cachet on the road to modern realism. '19
Justice Scalia criticizes this reasoning by analogizing that if this reasoning
holds true "then a grant of federal-question jurisdiction would give rise to
a power to create international-law-based federal common law just as ef-
fectively as would the ATS." 130 However, the Court's reasoning reflects no
more attenuation than the Court's reasoning in Boyle and Sabbatino.
More importantly, Sosa makes clear that the mere existence of a federal
source does not give rise to the creation of federal common law based on
CIL as it did in Boyle and Sabbatino.131 Instead, the Court further restricts
the instances which will give rise to the courts' authority to create fed-
eral common law through stringent limitations. First, courts must ascertain
whether any legislative intent exists to support the incorporation of CIL as
federal common law.132 Second, the offense giving rise to the incorporation
of CIL must pass the high threshold of specificity that the original Black-
stone offenses exhibited, and courts must view this in light of the practical
consequences that would result from recognizing such a claim.133 Even if
the CIL at issue survives those inquiries, a federal interest may not exist if
the parties asserting the claim have not exhausted their remedies through
other courts of justice or international tribunals.'M Lastly, Sosa requires a
case-specific deference to the legislative and executive branches.'3S
Although the Sosa analysis will inevitably entail some level of discre-
tion throughout each of the inquiries, the analysis can hardly be labeled a
"discretion-only analysis," 36 as Justice Scalia describes it. At the very least,
the level of discretion involved in conducting the Sosa analysis compares
to that utilized in Boyle, Miree, and Sabbatino and certainly provides more
guidance than Clearfield in determining which instances give rise to a fed-
eral interest.
2. Whether Federal Courts should Fashion a Federal Rule of Law to Protect
Federal Interests. -The way in which the federal courts have determined
whether state law would conflict with federal objectives further demon-
strates the degree of judicial discretion inherent in the Clearfield-Kimbell
129 Id. at 730.
130 Id. at at 745 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
131 Id. at 731 ("We must still, however, derive a standard or set of standards for assessing
the particular claim Alvarez raises....").
132 Id. atat 726.
133 Id. at 732-33.
134 Id. at 733 n.21.
135 Id. at 733.
136 Id. at 745 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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analysis. Boyle'3 7 serves as such an example. After finding a sufficient federal
interest,' 3s the Court continued to conduct the second part of the analysis in
which it determined that a federal rule of law was needed to avoid a conflict
with federal objectives.i39 The Court asserted that the state tort law which
assessed liability to the manufacturer for not designing a safety latch which
opened inward directly conflicted with the federal duty imposed on the
contractor to manufacture a hatch that opened outward.1 40 In creating this
defense, the Court also ignored some indication from Congress that it did
not intend to extend this defense to military contractors.' 4' By contrast, the
Sosa analysis explicitly requires courts to both consider legislative intent
generally and conduct a case-specific deference to both the legislature and
the executive. 142 Under the Sosa analysis, courts would have more difficulty
disregarding evidence of legislative intent than the Court in Boyle did.
In addition to finding that state law would conflict with federal pe-
cuniary interests, the Sabbatino Court also recognized that federal objec-
tives are frustrated by state law when a case implicates foreign affairs. 143
In determining that allowing state rules of law to control would frustrate
the federal government's need for uniformity and would "hinder... [the]
country's pursuit of goals both for itself and for the community of nations
as a whole,"' 44 Sabbatino emphasized that if "state courts [were] left free
to formulate their own rules, the purposes behind the doctrine could be
as effectively undermined as if there had been no federal pronouncement
on the subject."' 45 This same argument can be extended to apply to cases
involving CIL since both implicate foreign affairs. However, Sosa further
specifies when state law regarding CIL would frustrate federal objectives.
Under Sosa, that occurs when the international norm for which the claim is
based has reached the level of specificity and acceptance that the original
Blackstone offenses did.1
46
137 Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988).
138 Id. at 505-06 ("We think the reasons for considering these closely related areas to be
of'uniquely federal' interest apply as well to the civil liabilities arising out of the performance
of federal procurement contracts.").
139 Id. at 507-12.
140 Id. at 502-03,511-12.
141 Id. at 516 n.1, 518 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
142 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 726-33 (2004).
143 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398,423 (0964).
i44 Id.
145 Id. at 424.
146 Seesupra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
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B. Effectuating Legislative Intent
When a legislative act expressly provides for a private cause of action, fed-
eral courts have little trouble allowing such an action to proceed. 47 The
more difficult situation occurs when the courts are asked, as was the Sosa
Court, to recognize a private cause of action based on a statute that does
not explicitly create one. Although not occurring often, courts have allowed
such an action to proceed when doing so would effectuate the congressional
intent of the statute on which the claim is based.' 48 Just as any court's de-
termination that a federal interest exists to support creating a private cause
of action under Clearfield and its progeny involves some level of discretion,
the determination to allow a private cause of action to effectuate congres-
sional intent also necessitates judicial discretion. The three progressively
more restrictive approaches developed by the Supreme Court in Borak,'
49
Ash,'150 and Touche Ross's' evidence the discretionary nature of making such a
determination.5 2 Consistent with these approaches, the analysis developed
in Sosa provides guidance to lower courts in determining whether a cause
of action based on CIL would effectuate the legislative intent behind the
ATS and further offers a level of restrictiveness similar to or higher than
that in demonstrated in the above-mentioned approaches.
Because none of the three approaches for determining when allowing
a cause of action would effectuate legislative intent have been expressly
overruled, the lower federal courts do not enjoy a heightened level of clar-
ity in this area of federal common lawmaking. 53 As a result, criticism that
Sosa fails to provide the same type of guidance in the area of CIL law that
the Court has provided in other areas of federal common law is unfounded.
Further assertions that the level of discretion involved in the Sosa analysis
is inconsistent with the federal common law doctrine in this area cannot
be reconciled when the factors in the Sosa analysis are compared to those
involved in the other three approaches.
In short, Sosa stands for the proposition that allowing a cause of action
based on CIL only effectuates the legislative intent of the ATS when (i)
there is legislative intent, (2) the international norm has achieved the level
147 See, e.g., Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 110 (1989) ("[Clourts
are to develop a federal common law of rights and obligations under ERISA plans.")
148 See, e.g., Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 688 (1979); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak,
377 U.S. 426,433 (1964).
149 Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
150 Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
151 Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 56o (1979).
152 See supra notes 72-84 and accompanying text.
153 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 69, at § 6.3, at 388 ("[W]hen the Court uses the third ap-
proach, it cites cases decided under earlier approaches and no decisions have been expressly
overruled.")
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of specificity and acceptance comparable to Blackstone's three historical
offenses, (3) the plaintiff has exhausted all other remedies, and (4) the
legislative and executive branches have not indicated they should refrain
from doing so. 15 4 These factors provide for more guidance and allow for less
discretion than the Borak analysis which, without stating any factors for
consideration, simply advises lower federal courts that they may create a
private cause of action if damage suits would help accomplish the legisla-
tive purpose for the statute.
55
Similarly, Sosa offers more guidance and less discretion than the analy-
sis under Cort. Although the four factors that the Court developed in Co"
provide more guidance and allow for less discretion than Borak, the Co"
Court did not specify how much weight should be given to each factor.
Unlike the balancing test in Cori, the Sosa Court gave no indication that its
limiting factors may be balanced. Instead, the absence of one factor appears
to be the death knell for a cause of action as it was for Alvarez in Sosa. After
determining that the international norm against unlawful detainment did
not meet the specificity requirement, 56 the Court in Sosa did not proceed
to balance it with the other factors. Instead, the Court ended its analysis
and dismissed the cause of action.157
Of the three approaches, the restrictiveness of the analysis developed
in Sosa compares most to the analysis developed in the line of cases begin-
ning with Touche Ross. Rather than legislative intent serving as one factor in
a balancing test as in the Co" analysis, the Court in Touche Ross makes dis-
cerning the legislative intent the central focus.'15 In discerning legislative
intent, subsequent courts adhering to Touche Ross have considered whether
the statute in question provides for other remedies. 59 Similarly, under the
Sosa analysis, legislative intent is a decisive factor, the absence of which
would lead to the dismissal of a cause of action.'6" Also, like Touche Ross
154 See supra notes 42-55 and accompanying text.
155 See J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964).
156 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 736-38 (2004).
157 Id. at 738.
158 Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 575-76 (1979).
159 See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. I I, 18-22 (1979) (reason-
ing that the existence of other remedies in the statute reflected a lack of intent to allow private
actions); Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 290 (2001) (implying that the provision of other
methods of enforcement reflects an intent to preclude all others).
i6o Although the Court in Sosa does not state this explicitly, several aspects of its opinion
lead to this conclusion. First, the Court explains that "the general practice has been to look for
legislative guidance before exercising innovative authority over substantive law," and that "it
would be remarkable to take a more aggressive role in exercising a jurisdiction that remained
largely in shadow for much of the prior two centuries." Sosa, 542 U.S. at 726. Second, the Court
expressly provides that even when other limiting factors-specificity and exhaustion of rem-
edies-are satisfied, a case-by-case deference to both the legislative and executive branches
must be given. Id. at 733. Finally, by dismissing the cause of action proposed by Alvarez on the
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and its progeny, the Sosa Court provides for the consideration of whether
other remedies exist for the cause of action in determining congressional
intent. ' The court in Sosa, however, may have provided an even more re-
strictive analysis than Touche Ross by requiring a case by case deference to
the executive branch and an analysis into the specificity of the norm from
which the cause of action is derived. 62 Although the Court did not explore
the parameters of this requirement, the presence of this factor suggests that
courts may be unable to recognize private causes of actions in instances
where the legislature has manifested intent to create a cause of action but
the executive has expressed a contrary intent. '63
CONCLUSION
In 2004, the Supreme Court in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain created controversy
when it determined that federal courts, pursuant to their federal common
law making authority, may recognize a private cause of action based upon
CIL in certain circumstances. This Note has examined the analysis de-
veloped in Sosa for the lower federal courts to follow when determining
whether to create these causes of action and compared it to other types
of federal common law. Despite criticisms to the contrary, the analysis de-
veloped by the Court in Sosa proves consistent with other types of federal
common law. As discussed, the restrictiveness of the Sosa analysis has been
underappreciated. The Sosa analysis provides a similar, and sometimes
higher, degree of restrictiveness and guidance than previous approaches
developed by the Court to determine when lower federal courts may exer-
cise their federal common law making authority and permit private causes
of action.
sole basis that the international norm of arbitrary detainment lacks the degree of specificity
its analysis requires, the Court demonstrates that it has not created a balancing test in which
the presence of one factor may outweigh the absence of another to allow a cause of action. See
id. at 737-38.
161 Id. at 733, n.21.
162 Id. at 733.
163 Id. ("[There is a strong argument that federal courts should give serious weight to
the Executive Branch's view of the case's impact on foreign policy.").
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